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David Hume and the probability of miracles
GEORGE I. MAVRODES
The University of Michigan, USA
Section X of David Hume’sAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
is probably the most celebrated and most influential discussion of miracles
in Western philosophical literature. That essay is unusually provocative and
suggestive, not least because it is full of claims and arguments whose mutual
coherence is immediately suspect.1 In addition, it is suggestive as much
for what it does not say as for what it does say. Hume’s openly expressed
conclusions are remarkable modest, at least when compared with the infer-
ences which some later enthusiasts have drawn from the essay. In partic-
ular, it is noteworthy that the essay itself is explicity restricted to the way
in which testimonybears on the credibility of miracles. The maxim which
Hume claims to have established is that “no human testimony can have such
force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such
system of religion.”2 Hume says nothing at all about whether people who
were themselveswitnessesof a miracle might thereby have a satisfactory
ground for believing in that miracle, and perhaps even for making it the
foundation of their religion. But if there were no witnesses of miracles, or at
least no people who claimed to be witnesses, there would presumably be no
miracle testimonies. We should not, therefore, hastily assume that testimonial
evidence is the whole evidential story about miracles. In this paper, how-
ever, I will not further explore this particular avenue. Like Hume’s essay, this
paper is restricted to the bearing of testimonial evidence on the credibility of
miracles.
The avenues which I do explore here are suggested to me by at least two
factors. One is the fact that I believe that there have been some miracles in the
history of the world, and that there are credible testimonies to some of these
miracles. No doubt some of the readers of this essay will share this factor with
me. Others, of course, will not. But the second factor may be more widely
shared.
Hume’s essay, it seems to me, gives rise to a profound cognitive dissonance
entirely apart from its religious implications. On the one hand, the principles
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and premisses to which Hume appeals in his argument strike one as plausible
and reasonable or so, at least, they seem to me. Hume says that they lead to the
conclusion quoted above. But the Humean principles (unlike his conclusions
here) do not seem to have anythingspecialin them about miracles or any other
distinctively religious matters. They are general principles about evidence,
reasonable credibility, probability, and the like. It looks as though they should
be applicable outside the special field of religious belief. And indeed Hume
himself puts them forward as general principles. Do we then conduct our own
intellectual lives in accordance with these plausible principles, employed in
the Humean way, in the ordinary course of affairs? Outside of religion, do we
treat testimonial evidence in the way in which Hume’s essay seems to suggest
is the proper way? It seems to me clear that we do not.
I do not mean merely that we sometimes fall a little short of what we might
think of as a Humean ideal. No, the fact is that our ordinary cognitive life
is filled with massivecounter-examples to what appears to be the Humean
proposal. Think, for example, of reading an account of one of the games
played in a bridge tournament, the sort of account which one may readily
find in a newspaper. Such an account will often have a diagram showing
just what cards were dealt to the four hands for that game. And now think
of what is the antecedent probability which we would estimate for exactly
that distribution of cards, making the estimate prior to having this testimony.
There are a vast number of ways – millions I suppose – in which four bridge
hands can be dealt from a shuffled deck, and this is just one particular way out
of that enormous range of possibilities. When I think of being invited to bet,
beforehand, that exactly this hand would be dealt, then the probability seems
vanishingly small, so close to zero that I can hardly tell the difference. But
when I have the newspaper article before me, then I judge it to be very likely
– not absolutely certain, of course, but fairly probable – that exactly this set
of hands was indeed dealt in that tournament. A single testimony, often by a
reporter completely unknown to us, seems sufficient to convert a staggering
improbability into something considerably more likely than not.
Our cognitive lives are filled with similar examples. Auto accidents happen
every day, and are reported every day. But almost every one of those accidents
is antecedently enormously improbable. Think of being invited to bet that
exactly those drivers, accompanied by just those passengers, in those cars,
would collide in that particular intersection, on that particular day – betting,
that is, antecedently to having the report in hand.3 Here again a single
testimony seems to make an enormous difference to our estimate of the
relevant probability.
That such dramatic reversals could occur on the basis of a single testimony,
and that such reversals could be epistemically respectable, is not something
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which would be suggested by a reading of Hume’s essay. And yet almost all
of us, at least when we are not thinking about religion, take these enormous
reversals as a matter of course, and we have no doubt that they comport very
well indeed with the canons of rationality. That dissonance – the initial plausi-
bility of Hume’s principles, and their apparently dismal record in everyday
life – is the second source of the reflections I pursue here.
I organize this paper around a single element, a crucial element, in Hume’s
argument – or rather in Hume’s proposal for the rational conduct of our
cognitive lives. Hume proposes a strategy for a rational thinker to use in
considering miracle testimonies. He treats the credibility of miracles – at
least insofar as that credibility involves some important appeal to testimony
– as depending upon a comparison of probabilities. He wants to compare the
probability of miracles with the probability of error and deception in human
testimony. The desired outcome of this comparison – desired by Hume, that
is – is that the probability of the miracle is always lower than the probability
that the testimony is mistaken or lying.4 Applying the principle which he puts
forward early in the essay5 – “A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to
the evidence” – he reaches the conclusion that the course of wisdom would be
that of rejecting the testimony rather than accepting the miracle. And in order
for this line of argument to be successful, it is necessary that the probability
assigned to the miraculous should always be very low.
Of course, in order to make such a comparison we must somehow “have”
the relevant probabilities. That is, we must make some estimate of the proba-
bilities. I suppose that our probability judgments need not be precise, carried
out to four decimal places. They can be rough estimates. But they must have
enough substance in them to allow us, at least, to say something like “This
is more likely than that.” If we don’t have probability judgments which can
sustain that minimum level of comparison, then there is no hope of carrying
out the Humean strategy.
So we need two probabilities, one about miracles and one about testimony.
Both of these generate interesting and important questions. In this paper I
will focus on the probability of miracles, bringing in considerations about the
other probability only peripherally. And I will be considering two questions,
more or less concurrently. The first question asks for a clearer specification of
just what it is for which we are trying to estimate a probability. So far I have
tried to speak rather vaguely on this point – “the probability of miracles” and
the like. But there are several distinct probabilities, not just one, associated
with miracles, and some of these may be vastly different from the others.
Which probability is relevant to the Humean project?
The second question concerns the way in which a reasonable judgment
about that probability might be grounded. And here I will concentrate on
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Hume’s suggestion that probability judgments are properly grounded, in the
end, upon experience. I will be asking whether it is plausible to suppose that
Hume had any experience which was relevant to an appropriate probability
judgment, and also whether we ourselves have any such experience.
We can begin the exploration by considering a hypothetical case which
Hume himself puts forward:
When any one tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immedi-
ately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person
should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates,
should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other;and
according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision,
and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony
would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not
till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.6
The terminology of this passage is unfortunate, I think, in Hume’s use here
of the terms “miracle” and “miraculous.” It seems obvious, from other things
that Hume says in this essay, that he does not think that there is anything
at all miraculous about the falsehood of human testimony. He does not, for
example, think a mistaken or lying testimony is a transgression of a law
of nature. It seems to me, therefore, that the only plausible way to make
sense of this passage is to take the words “miracle” and “miraculous,” when
they refer to the possibility that the testimony is true, not in the sense which
Hume defined, nor in the perhaps vaguer sense which they have in ordinary
religious speech and writing, but merely as rhetorical surrogates there for
“improbable.”7
On the other hand, it seems probable that Hume really did think that “a dead
man restored to life” would be a miracle in his defined sense, a transgression of
a law of nature.8 In fact, it seems probable that Hume’s hypothetical case was
intended to mirror the fact that many Christians believe that the resurrection
of Jesus is the miraclepar excellencein the Christian faith.
Reading the passage in this way gives us, I think, a pretty good idea of the
core of the Humean strategy on this topic. That strategy consists, as I said,
of comparing the probability of miracles with the probability of error and
deception in human testimony.
Well, OK. That procedure seems to have at least someprima facieplausi-
bility about it. We may not be ready to swallow the Wise Man’s Principle just
as it stands. Hume himself, we may notice, does not give any argument or
reason in support of it. Even if we take evidence to be relevant to the rational
propriety of belief we may not be ready to commit ourselves to the claim that
it is theonly relevant factor.9 At least, I am not ready for that commitment.
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But that is a line of criticism which I will not pursue here. I will go along, for
the time being, with the initial plausibility of this Humean strategy.
So, let us try to get some feel for what this strategy involves by actually
trying it on Hume’s hypothetical example. We can begin by formulating a
proposition asserting that a miraculous event, a resurrection, has occurred:
M: Henry was restored to life a few days after his death.
And we can also imagine the sort of testimony which might impel us to
consider the possibility that the resurrection did indeed take place:
T: I saw Henry, alive and well, a few days after his death, we have had
breakfast together a couple of times since then, I’ve gone fishing with
him once,: : : 10
And then we can think of assigning a probability to M – that is, the probability
that M is true, that the event “should really have happened.” We can also
assign a probability to T – the probability that the testifier really did have the
experiences, etc., which he or she reports.11
When we have these values in hand then we can easily calculate probability
values for the negations of both M and T. A standard rule for consistent
probabilities stipulates that the probability ofM is simply 1  P(M).12
And the probability ofT (i.e., that the testifier “should either deceive or be
deceived”) is 1  P(T). So altogether we can get four probabilities, and then
we can compare them by pairs.
Hume himself suggests that he compares the probability of M with that of
T. And he says that he will always “reject the greater miracle.” Presumably
that means that he will reject whichever of this pair has the lower probability.
And when he refers to something which would “command my belief or
opinion,” perhaps he is also suggesting that he will accept whichever of this
pair has the higher probability.
However, that project is complicated (and compromised!) by the fact that M
and T are not logically independentpropositions. That fact is not idiosyncratic
to this example. Miracle assertions and the corresponding miracle testimonies
are characteristically not logically independent. The content of a miracle
testimony usually entails either the corresponding miracle assertion, or some
closely related proposition. But the entailment often does not run in the
opposite direction. So, in our example here, T entails M, and M does not
entail T.
The entailment from T to M has an important probability consequence. M
imposes a “probability cap” on T. In a consistent set of probability assign-
ments. T cannot have a probability higher than M. That is, if Henry did not
rise from the dead then the testifier did not have the reported experiences. So
the probability that the experiences really transpired – breakfast with Henry
a few days after his death, etc. – cannot be higher than the probability that
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Henry really was restored to life. Looked at from the other side, T puts a
“probability floor” under M. M cannot have a probability lower than that of
T. So we can say that, in a consistent system.
P(T)6 P(M)
P(M)> P(T)
Suppose then that Hume begins by assigning a low probability to M. (I
suspect, indeed, that he did begin in that way.) That requires, if his probabil-
ities are to be consistent, that the probability of T also be that low or lower.
So if the assigned probability of M is less than 0.5, then the probability of T
is also less than 0.5. But then the probability ofT must be greater than 0.5.
Hume says that he compares the probability of M with that ofT, and he
rejects whichever has the lower probability. But of course the probability of
M (less than 0.5) turns out to be lower than that ofT (greater than 0.5). So
Hume, proceeding in this way, would of course reject the miracle, and would
presumably believe that the testifier was either deceived or deceiving.
I say, “proceeding in this way.” In fact, I suspect that Hume did proceed in
this way. However, there is something misleading in saying that this procedure
involves a genuine comparison of probabilities. For the first probability which
is assigned generates arithmeticallya l the other values, including the one
with which the first one will be compared. Thus, the result of the putative
comparison is guaranteed by the assignment of that single probability. Surely
there is something fishy in that.
Perhaps that fishy odor becomes a little stronger when we notice that we
could just as easily have worked in the opposite direction, beginning instead
with the assignment of a probability to T. Maybe, e.g. we have had a long
experience with this testifier, and have found him to be moderately reliable.
Suppose we estimate, on the basis of our past experience with him, that his
reliability is about 0.7. So we assign that probability to T. Consistency then
requires an assignment at least that high to M, so we give M also the value of
0.7. Arithmetic tells us that the probability ofT is 0.3. If we now make the
Humean comparison, M againstT, we find that it isT which has much the
lower probability and is to be rejected. And so we accept M, and presumably
T along with it.
The initial proposal had at least the appearance of plausibility and even-
handedness about it. We were to compare the probability of two propositions
(or, perhaps, two possible states of affairs, etc.), and then we were to prefer,
as a candidate for our belief, the one which had the higher probability. But it
turns out that we can, to a large extent, manipulate the result of this putative
comparison merely by a careful choice of which of the probabilities to assign
first. And that seems to be epistemically (rationally, etc.) unsatisfactory.
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It might be suggested, therefore, that the initial assignments of probability
to both M and T really should be made independently of each other, with no
concern over whether these assignments are mutually consistent. Concerns
with consistency should be postponed to a later stage of the investigation,
when we may have a (relatively) final set of probability assignments, with
values perhaps radically revised from the initial estimates. The initial assign-
ments would be, in some sense, “antecedent” probabilities, and the later
assignments would be their “consequent” descendants.
If this suggestion is adopted, then it is important to remember that the
Humean comparison must be made on the basis of the initial antecedent
probabilities, even if these values are mutually incompatible. For Hume wants
the comparison of probabilities to serve as a guide to the rational use of the
testimonial evidence. If we are to be Humeans here, then we don’t know what
to do with the testimonial evidence untilafterwe have made this comparison.
In the remainder of this paper I will assume that this is the project which
we are attempting. And I will focus on just one half of that project, that of
assigning a probability to the miracle side of the comparisonndependently
of making any judgment about the testimony.
On what basis should we assign the miracle probability? Not on the basis
of testimony, of course. We must, therefore, have a miracle probability which
is “antecedent” to testimonial evidence. But perhaps it need not be antecedent
to everything; perhaps the probability judgment can havesomebasis. Several
times in this essay Hume suggests that we have to acquire the relevant prob-
abilities fromexperience. It is a general maxim, Hume says, “that no objects
have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which
we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of
their constant and regular conjunction.”13 And he explicitly applies this to
our reliance on human testimony, which has no basis, he claims, other than
our experience of the usual conjunction of testimony and truth.14 And it is in
the same way, by appeal to experience, that we judge that all men must die,
that fire consumes wood, and so on.15
Well, what experience might Hume have had which would be relevant
to assigning a low probability to the miraculous? Or, for that matter, what
experience dowehave which would be relevant to our assignment of such a
probability? Hume makes some claims about human experience in general,
and I will come to them shortly. But he does not, I think, say anything about his
own experience specifically. Human experience in general, however, must be
somehow a function of the experience of particular human beings. To begin,
therefore, I want to speculate a little about what may have been Hume’s own
experience with regard to miracles. This exercise is somewhat conjectural,
but that need not trouble us much. For if we can recall and recognize some
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experience of our own which seems more relevant than the experience which
I attribute to Hume, then we can shift to consideration of that experience of
our own. I must confess, however, that I do not recall any experience of my
own which would be more relevant to Hume’s purpose than the experience
which I here attribute to him. And what if it turns out that neither Hume’s
experience nor ours is relevant? Well, that might be a significant result.
If we are to speculate about Hume’s experience relative to some miracle,
however, what miracle (or alleged miracle) shall we think about? I have no
problem with supposing that Hume really did have some experience which
would support his assigning a very low probability to the claim that a particular
friend of his had been restored to life within a week of his death. And, for that
matter, I think that I have some experience which would justify me in a similar
assignment of probabilities with respect to some of my own acquaintances.
But these cases are not of much interest, because nobody (so far as I know)
has made them “the foundation of his religion.” But there is a case which does
generate just that sort of interest, and Hume no doubt had it in mind when he
introduced the subject of resurrection into this essay. That case, of course, is
the alleged resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth a few days after his execution.
That putative miracle does play an important role in an actual religion, many
of the followers of that religion count believing in that resurrection as one of
their important religious beliefs, and it may in some sense be a “foundation”
of that religion. I propose, therefore, to replace the hypothetical Henry of our
previous example with Jesus. We thus get a miracle claim which is an element
in an actual religion, one which is believed and professed by many people,
and about which there apparently were actual testimonies.
J: Jesus of Nazareth was restored to life a few days after his execution.
What is the probability of that proposition? And on what basis might that
probability be assigned?
I suppose that different people will give very different answers to the first
of those questions. I, for example, assign a very high probability to it – maybe
about as close to 1 as makes no difference. But in saying that, I suppose that I
am not really being as “antecedent” as the Humean project requires. I might
try to abstract, imaginatively, from my interaction with the biblical texts, the
creeds, the church, etc., and to estimate what probability I would assign to it
if I were to get back to some “bare bones” state. But in speculating about that
I would not be much better off than in speculating about Hume.
I suspect that Hume thought that the probability of J is very low, maybe
so close to O as to make no difference. But as a matter of fact, Hume (so
far as I know) says nothing at all about assigning a probability directly
to this proposition, or to any similar proposition. And, given his professed
stance of relying on experience, that reticence is understandable. For the
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resurrection of Jesus, if it happened at all, happened more than 1500 years
prior to Hume’s birth. And, if it happened, it happened somewhere in the
vicinity of Jerusalem, far distant from Edinburgh. It is not hard to imagine
that some first century resident of Judea might have had some ordinary
experience which was directly relevant to the probability of J. Someone, for
example, might have seen Jesus (or somebody who looked just like Jesus,
etc.) walking about, eating, conversing, etc., a few days after the crucifixion.
Or, for that matter, someone may have seen Jesus’ corpse (or a corpse which
looked just like Jesus, etc.) decaying over a period of three or four weeks. But
it is hard to imagine that Hume might have had either of those experiences, or
anything in the same ballpark. He just lived in the wrong place and time for
that. And, of course, we are no better off than Hume in this respect. Neither
Hume nor we seem to be in a good position to assign a probabilitydirectly to
J on the basis of our own experience.
It does not follow immediately, however, that the Humean project must be
a failure. For there may be ani direct way of basing such a judgment on
experience. And that is where some generalization about resurrections may
become relevant. For consider the following generalization:
R: There are some resurrections (i.e., at least one) in the history of the
world.
And also its contradictory
NR: There are no resurrections in the history of the world.
J entails R (thought notvice versa). And is logically incompatible with NR.
And so, in a consistent system of probabilities, R imposes a probability
cap on J. Therefore, if Hume’s experience (or ours) could directly justify
assigning a low probability of R, then it would also indirectly justify at least
that low a probability for J. And a high probability for J would imply a high
probability for R. (The entailments do not run in the opposite direction. E.g.,
a high probability for R does not entail a high probability for J.) Of course,
a low probability for R is equivalent to a high probability for NR. So we get
corresponding relations between the probabilities for J and NR.
Generalizations about miracles, resurrections, etc., are attractive for the
Humean project because of the interaction of two factors. First, Hume (and
we also) really do have experiences which can plausibly ground probability
judgments about some such generalizations. And second, some such general-
izations really do have a bearing on the probability of relevant singular claims,
such as J. We must remember, however, that apart from their bearing on some
important singular claim, generalizations about miracles, resurrections, etc.,
would seem to be of little importance to Christianity.16 And so it would be, I
suppose, with most religions.
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What then would be the relevant feature of Hume’s experience? I think it
is the fact that in his own experience he had never come across a miraculous
event. Or, at any rate, he had never come across an event in his own experience
which he took to be miraculous. More specifically, with reference to this
particular case, the relevant feature of Hume’s experience would be that he
had never himself personally witnessed a resurrection. Various of his friends
and acquaintances had, I suppose, died by the time he wrote this essay. But
he had not seen a single one of them restored to life. Leaving aside, for the
moment, the general experience of the human race, this would be the feature
of Hume’s own personal experience which might seem relevant to assessing
the probability of miracles, or at least to assessing the probability of this
particular miracle, a resurrection from the dead.
I focus on this conjecture for the time being for three reasons. First, I
have no reason to doubt that Hume’s experience really did have this negative
feature. Second, I share that negative experience with Hume. Like him, I
have never witnessed a case of a dead person restored to life. And I think that
many of you who read or hear this paper will say the same about yourself.
And third, I think that this negative experience, on Hume’s part and on our
own, is indeed relevant to probability judgments about miracles.
But just how is it relevant? Perhaps this is the most important question
we can ask about Hume’s strategy here. Hume, we have supposed, never
observed a resurrection. I have not observed one, and perhaps you have not
either. How do facts like that bear on the probability of a resurrection – on the
probability, that is, of R? Here I can put forward what is perhaps the central
thesis of this paper.
These negative experiences, Hume’s and yours and mine, are (for all
practical purposes) completely irrelevant to the probabilities of R and
NR.
And the reason is simple and straightforward. Hume’s sample is just too small
to support, to any significant degree, any probability judgment at all about
propositions R and NR. And so is your sample and mine.
There have been, I suppose, at least several billion human deaths in the
history of the world. R and NR are propositions whose truth value might be
determined by the presence or absence of asinglequick resurrection within
that vast panoply of cases. Now, suppose for the moment that there was, in fact,
one resurrection in the history of the world. In that case R would be true and
NR would be false. But what is the likelihood that Hume’s sample of deaths
and their immediate aftermath – 20 cases, 40, even 100 – would have caught
that one anomalous event? In the absence of any reason to suppose that Hume
was in a specially advantageous position to observe that event, if it happened,
it seems to me that the probability of his catching it is almost infinitesimally
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small. The experience which I have here attributed to Hume is, of course,
just what we should have expected it to be if NR is true, i.e., if there are no
resurrections at all. But it is also just what we should have expected it to be if
R is true, and the number of resurrections is very small – maybe one, or two,
or half a dozen. Because these two different assumptions make only a tiny,
practically infinitesimal, difference to the likelihood of Hume’s observing a
resurrection, his failure to observe one makes no significant difference to
the probability of one rather than the other. But they are contradictories. So
Hume’s negative experience is irrelevant to their probability.17 And so, of
course, is your negative experience and mine, and for the same reason.
I said above, however, that these negative experiences really are relevant to
some generalizations about resurrections, and about miracles more generally.
Think, for example, of the following claim:
CR: Speedy resurrections are very common in the history of the world
(more than half of all human deaths are followed by a restoration to life
within a week, etc.).
And the contrasting claim:
RR: Speedy resurrections, if they occur at all, are extremely rare in the
history of the world.
Hume’s negative experience, it seems to me, really is relevant to assigning
probabilities to these propositions. (And so also is our experience.) And
the reason is the mirror image of the reason for the earlier irrelevance. If
resurrections were really common occurrences, then it is quite likely that
Hume would have come across one or more of them in his own experience. I
too would probably have noticed one, and so would you. But in fact Hume did
not observe any resurrection, I have not, etc. So it is unlikely that resurrections
are common occurrences. That is, the probability of CR is very low. And the
probability of RR is high.
But what does that have to do with any actual religion? Well, for Christianity
at least, very little. No Christian that I know of asserts CR, or anything
remotely resembling CR. None of them would be disturbed by the claim that
CR is very improbable. (They might, I suppose, wonder who it was who
thought that CR was probable.) And what if someone claimed that RR was
probable? Well, RR might well strike the Christians as what they have always
believed. No surprises there, no problem for them.
It is, of course, crucial to recognize (and to remember) that RR is not the
same proposition as NR. NR is incompatible with J, and so a high probability
for NR entails a low probability for J. But RR is not incompatible with J,
and so a high probability for RR need not impose a low probability on J. The
world is chock-full of things which are rare, but which nevertheless really do
happen. Take quintuplets, for example. The birth of quintuplets is very rare
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among humans, averaging only one out of many thousands of pregnancies. A
lot of my friends have children, but none of them have quints. So far as I know,
none of my friends are themselves part of a set of quints. For quintuplet births,
the analogue of RR has an extremely high probability. We have very good
experiential evidence that quintuplet births are very rare. But the analogue of
J also has a very high probability. For we also have good evidence – for a
few of us experiential, and for the rest of us testimonial – that there really are
some quintuplet births. And that is by no means an uncommon pattern in the
world. The world is full of unlikely events.
This point sometimes gets obscured by an unfortunate way of speaking.
Sometimes a person will say something like
QU: Quintuplets are unlikely.
And this is the analogue of
RU: Resurrections are unlikely.
I suppose that people who say QU probably do not mean to say that it is
unlikely that there are any quints in the history of the world. Probably they
believe, like most of the rest of us, that there have been some actual quintuplet
births. But what then do they mean by QU? Sometimes, I think, QU is used just
as a stylistic variant of the statement that quintuplets are rare. And sometimes
it really does express a probability judgment, a judgment which is based
on that rarity. If you think, for example, of picking out a pregnancy pretty
much at random – the first woman to give birth in Ann Arbor’s St. Joseph
Mercy Hospital in 2001, say – and you think of betting that the upshot will a
quintuplet birth, then you probably will think that such a bet is very unlikely
to win. And you would, I suppose, be right. QU is sometimes used, I think,
to express a probability judgment like that one.
RU has the same form as QU. And it can be used to say the analogous sorts
of things. It can, I think, mean merely that resurrections are rare, which is just
what RR says. Or it can mean that a randomly selected death is unlikely to be
followed by a speedy resurrection. And that would not be disputed by many
Christians. But RU is that it might also be taken to mean something quite
different, i.e., that it is unlikely that there are any resurrections. It might be
taken, that is, as expressing the judgment that the probability of R is very low.
There is nothing wrong with expressing that judgment. But it is unfortunate
and misleading when the plausibility of RUin its other sensesgets transferred,
perhaps without our noticing it, to this last sense.
We really do have to be on guard against this transference. If someone
says to me, “But doesn’t your own experience suggest that resurrections
are unlikely?”, then I feel right away like saying, “Yes, of course it does.”
What I’m doing in that response is taking his question in one (or both) of
the first senses above – a question about rarity, or about the probability for
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a random case. If the interlocutor goes on to say, “But isn’t that just what
Hume is saying?”, then I have to say, “No. Or at least, it’s not what he needs
to say. What Hume needs is the claim that it is unlikely that there are any
resurrections in the world. not just that resurrections are rare. And that’s not
what I’m saying.”
Well, where are we now? What we’ve come to is that neither Hume’s
experience nor ours gives us any good direct ground for assigning a low
probability to J. (Of course, it doesn’t give us any ground for a high probability
there either.) On the other hand, Hume’s experience (and ours) does give us
grounds for probability judgments about some generalizations concerning
resurrections. But those generalizations do not support a low probability for
J. There is a generalization which would have that consequence, but our
experience does not give us a ground for thinking that generalization to be
probable. So far Hume’s project looks unpromising.
It might be suggested, of course, that we have been looking too narrowly,
just at Hume’s personal experience and ours. But might we not expand the
sample by adding to our own experience the experiences of other people? Of
course. And indeed in this essay Hume appears to make just that attempt. He
makes repeated references to human experience in general.
This attempt, however, generates at least two related problems. I will
mention the first here, but I will not say very much about it. A person who
attempts to estimate the probability of some proposition may know what his
or her own experience has been, and may then try to assess the relevance of
that experience to the task at hand. But if one wants to cast a wider net, and
to include the experience of others, then how can one get in touch with those
experiences which are not one’s own? It would seem that the normal way-
perhaps the only way available to human beings – is by way of the testimony
of those other people. But Hume’s strategy here seems to require us to decide
upon whether to accept a testimony byfirst comparing the probability of its
falsehood with the probability of the event which the testimony reports. That
would seem to require us first to estimate the probability of the event on, at
best, the evidence of our own limited experience, and then, if that probability
is low, we would be required to reject contrary testimony. It is hard to see
how Hume, if he were consistent, could ever take seriously the wider body of
experience which would give him a sounder basis for a reasonable probability
estimate.
The second (and related) problem, about which I will say a little more,
is this. If we do try to expand the sample beyond Hume’s own personal
experience (or mine or yours), then what do we find? What do we find, that is,
not by armchair theorizing but by actually examining that expanded sample?
Well, Hume seems eager to tell us what the result of that trial is. He says
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that “it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life; because that has
never been observed in any age or country. There must therefore be a uniform
experience against every miraculous event: : : ” 18 So Hume’s picture of things
seems to go like this. His own personal experience has the negative feature
of not including any observation of a resurrection. And when he expands
the sample to include the experience of the whole human race he gets the
same negative result. The miraculous event, Hume tells us, “has never been
observed in any age or country.”
But why should we believe Hume on this point? Why, that is, should we
believe that the universal experience of the human race has uniformly been
devoid of any experience of the miraculous? I have no problem with accepting
pretty much whatever negative feature Hume may want to claim for his own
experience. But I am not at all inclined to believe him when he assigns that
same negative feature to the experience of the whole human race. He says
not merely that he has never observed a resurrection, but that a resurrection
has never been observed in any age or country. But he suggests absolutely no
evidence at all for this latter claim. Of course, the claim might possible be
true. But why should we suppose that it is? The clearest fact in this whole area
would seem to be thatthe testimony about resurrections,and other apparently
miraculous happenings, is not uniform. Some people, like Hume, profess not
to have observed any such things. Well and good. Perhaps they have not. But
the fact is that some other people profess that they have personally observed
just such events. When it comes to resurrections, for example, there have
apparently been some people who claimed to have seen Jesus a few days after
his execution, alive and well, talking with them, eating with them, and so on.
Where does that leave us? We can, if we want, choose to rely entirely on
our own personal experience. A consequence will be that, in many important
cases, that body of experience which belongs to us personally will be too
small to provide a reasonable basis for the kind of probability judgments
which we want to make. Or we can try to expand the base by adding to our
own experience the experiences of a large number of other people. But our
only way of carrying out that expansion is by appealing to the testimony of
those other people. In that case, at least if we are to proceed empirically, we
have to take the testimonies as we actually find them. We cannot just make up
testimonies to suit ourselves.Nor can we properly leave out testimonies just
to suit ourselves. In the case of miracles, the fact that there are these other
troubling minority testimonies, the testimonies of those who claim to have
experienced miracles themselves, becomes part of the data with which we
must deal.19
It might, of course, turn out that the whole Humean project is flawed at
some deeper level than I have examined here. Maybe, for example, Hume’s
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attraction to a radical empiricism is at fault, leading him to ignore some other
essential features of a viable intellectual life, features which have more of
an apriori , or innatist, flavor about them. Maybe, for example, there are
some probability judgments which are important to our cognitive life, but
which are not based on experience. Here I have said nothing for or against
this conjecture, or any other alternative to Hume’s own professed project. In
any case, however, the project to which he seems to commit himself in this
essay provides no sound basis for assigning a low probability to the general
thesis that there are some miracles in the history of the world. Nor does it
provide a sound basis for assigning a low antecedent probability to singular
miracle claims, such as that of Jesus’ resurrection. Consequently, probability
comparisons which involve any of those probabilities as one of the terms
need not be expected to be always unfavorable to the miracle claims.
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Notes
1. Compare, for example, what Hume says about the quality of miracle testimonies in the
first part of Part II, pp. 78–80, with what he says about the reports of miracles associated
with the tomb of Abb̀e Paris (pp. 83–85). The quotations in this paper, along with the
page citations and footnote citations, are taken from the edition of theEnquiryedited by
Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977). TheEnquirywas first
published in 1758.
2. Part II, p. 88.
3. Almost any driver, I would suppose, who judged that there was even a 50-50 chance that
they would have a serious accident if they were to drive on a given day, would almost
surely refrain from driving on that day. I would, anyway.
4. If the probability of the miracle were not always lower than the probability that the
testimony is false, then Hume’s strategy would sometimes yield a belief in a miracle.
5. Part I, p. 73.
6. Part I, p. 77.
7. But elsewhere in the essay Hume really does seem to use “miracle” in more or less the
sense which he defines – “a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the
Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.” Part I, p. 77.
8. Or that it at least satisfies the first clause of that definition. Perhaps Hume here, like many
later interlocutors, simply ignores the second clause of the definition. Or maybe he thinks
that the second clause is really redundant, implied by the first.
9. William James is, of course, famous for an additional suggestion in “The Will to Believe.”
10. I express both of these propositions without using the word “miracle,” and that is deliberate.
I take it that a person might give a miracle testimony without using that word, and indeed
without having any concept of a miracle. Or he might have that concept and believe that
the event he was reporting did not satisfy that concept and hence was not a miracle. But
182 GEORGE I. MAVRODES
if the event as described does in fact satisfy that concept, then the testifier is testifying to
the occurrence of a miracle, regardless of whether he recognizes that significance in his
testimony. Whatever his own evaluation of his report may be, that report might giveus
reason to believe that a miracle had ocurred.
11. This is not, of course, the probability that the testifierthinks that he or she had these
experiences. We are not assessing the sincerity of the testifier, but rather the reliability of
the testimony. Cf. Hume’s concern that the testifier may be either deceiving or deceived.
12. Where P(M) is the probability of M, etc. We need not have numerical values for these
probabilities in order to make the relevant “calculations.” If we judge that the probability
of M is simplyvery low, then we will also judge that the probability ofM is very high.
13. Part I, p. 74.
14. Ibid. Hume’s Scottish contemporary, Thomas Reid, put forth an alternative view, that there
is an innate human disposition to accept testimony, and that human intellectual life could
not get under way without this disposition. Was Hume aware of this dissenting voice?
15. Part I, p. 76.
16. In the SPR discussion, this point was strongly urged by Professor Paul Draper. My thanks
to him for stressing it.
17. This is, of course, the line of reasoning which is formalized in Bayes’ Theorem.
18. Part I, p. 77.
19. It might be suggested that the wider experience of the human race provides us with
something stronger than merely a collection of testimonies – it provides us with well-
grounded laws of nature. And so perhaps “no resurrections” is a law of nature, or a
consequence of some more general and fundamental laws of nature. And maybe it is (I’m
inclined to think so myself). But that cannot help with this project.
Either a law of nature logically allows for a few exceptions (i.e., Humean “transgres-
sions”) in the actual course of events, or else it does not. If it allow for a few actual
exceptions, then establishing “When you’re dead, you stay dead” as a law of nature will
have no bearing on the probability of R and of NR, and hence no bearing on the probability
of J.
Some philosophers – e.g. Alastair McKinnon, “‘Miracle’ and ‘Paradox’,” inAmerican
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. IV (1967), pp. 308–314 – have argued that the idea of a
violation of a law of nature is logically incoherent. A law of nature cannot (logically) have
any exceptions; the law just is whatever actually happens. That seems to me implausible,
but I will not argue it here. (But cf. the discussion by Richard Swinburne inThe Concept
of Miracle (London: MacMillan, 1970), Chap. 3.) In any case, this way of construing a
law of nature will leave us with roughly the same difficulty, though perhaps in a different
place. We cannot use the “no resurrections” thesis to rule out R (and thus to rule out J) until
we know whether it is indeed a (McKinnon-type) law of nature. But we cannot know that
it is a law of nature of that sort until we have a way of ruling out the minority testimonies,
the testimonies to a resurrection.
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